This article, by John Podhoretz, in Commentary Magazine, is one of the best I've seen when it comes to analysis of the 2006 Election Cycle.
I'm not so much interested in re-hashing the 2006 Election Cycle, or demonstrating any opinions of it. However, I find Podhoretz's analysis of American attitudes towards the war enlightening.
I'll highlight a few portions of the article here, but you'll benefit from reading the entire article.
Podhoretz summarizes his argument about 1/4 of the way through the article.
For a midterm election, what happened in 2006 was an uncommon event: a national wave. In the past half-century, there have been only two others like it, the first in 1974 when Democrats won 75 seats in the House and four in the Senate and the second in 1994. In all three cases, there was a single, identifiable, overwhelming reason for the loss. The 1974 election occurred in the wake of Watergate. The 1994 election took place in the wake of the effort by the Clinton administration to nationalize health care. And the 2006 election? It was decided not because of a few corrupt Republicans, or because Congress had spent a great deal, or because of a flawed immigration measure. It was decided by the fact that the United States was on the verge of suffering a cataclysmic defeat in war.
He has a strong narrative on fading support for the war in 2005.
Meanwhile, for many of those who had supported the war, the Katrina crisis signified something far more disturbing. Having watched despairingly as roadside bombs and improvised explosive devices in Iraq did their monstrous work on a daily basis, they had already begun to entertain severe misgivings. Support for the war, which was at 50 percent nationally at the end of 2004, sank through 2005, almost entirely due to changes of heart among independent voters. And it was these independents who fled the farthest from Bush after Katrina. Washington’s response to the catastrophe suggested to them that Bush did not know what he was doing—and therefore that the trust they had shown him in 2004 had been misplaced.
“This will take time and patience,” Bush said of Iraq in 2005. But not until November of that year did he attempt to present an explicit “Strategy for Victory.” And that document simply repackaged the administration’s existing approach, envisioning not a battlefield defeat of the enemy but a gradual withering-away thanks to progress on the political and economic fronts and enhanced training of Iraqi troops.
As a matter of military strategy, as Bush would concede after the 2006 election, this was a flawed approach. It was also flawed as a matter of wartime leadership. In the realm of public opinion, a war must be won and an enemy must be defeated; for a nation with men fighting on foreign soil, there can be no other major goal. And there was worse. Bush had prevailed in 2004 by offering the implicit promise of winning in Iraq. But then, with great fanfare, he had announced that the great project of his second term would be—an effort to restructure Social Security. He had no mandate for such a thing, and the refusal of Republicans on Capitol Hill to line up behind it was a harbinger of similar discontents to come.
In October 2005, one month after Katrina, the President made the ill-advised decision to nominate his White House counsel Harriet Miers for a Supreme Court vacancy. This caused an eruption in elite conservative opinion, and he was forced to withdraw the nomination (while claiming that she was the one who dropped out). Miers was indeed a poor choice, but under different circumstances Bush would have had little difficulty in assuring her confirmation. What made the conservative revolt possible was not her lack of credentials but Bush’s gradual loss of standing in his own party—a loss due entirely to the sense that he might be flying blind in Iraq.
He was even more compromised in the early months of 2006 as Iraq descended into nightmarish sectarian violence following the February bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. It was against this backdrop that the President advanced his immigration-reform bill. It was not well-drafted and deserved to be defeated. Even so, however, Bush had been championing most of its provisions since his days as governor of Texas, and his advocacy had not prevented a single conservative activist from supporting him wholeheartedly in 2000 or in 2004.
Had he come before the American people as the victor in Iraq, Bush would have had his immigration bill for the taking—with, to be sure, muted grumbling from some of his backers analogous to the grumbling after the passage of his education legislation in 2001 or the prescription-drug entitlement in 2003. In 2006, however, he found himself on the receiving end of wildly intemperate blasts of scorn, contempt, rage, and disgust, and his own party killed the bill.
By November, going into the election, the GOP was divided, weakened, and disheartened. Had the Iraq war gone differently, none of this would have been the case.
Podhoretz has interesting things to say about 2007 as well.
What had happened? If the results of the 2006 election had indeed been a straightforward mandate for the Democratic view that “this war is lost” (as Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid would put it in April 2007), legislation sent from Capitol Hill to the White House would have reflected that conviction. Democrats from Bush districts would not have objected, and fearful Republicans would have crossed party lines to side with their Democratic colleagues. That is what occurs when an issue has a mandate.
Yet Democrats could not get a single withdrawal proposal through the legislative process to the President’s desk. What is more, their efforts to do so have endeared them to no one: neither disaffected independents, nor depressed Republicans, nor liberals crying for Bush’s head. To the contrary: according to polls, the present Democratic leadership in Congress is the object of an icy public scorn several degrees cooler even than the permafrost in which George W. Bush has been embalmed.
Finally, he concludes with his thoughts on how this impacts things in 2008.
It is a great irony that the best political news for Republicans in a notably unfavorable election year—with the public telling pollsters that it is desirous of change and prefers Democratic stands on most issues by margins ranging from ten to twenty points—may come out of Iraq. Should the surge’s progress continue and deepen, the Democratic nominee may find himself or herself in a very uncomfortable position come autumn. The Democratic base will not have changed its mind about the war’s evil, and it will not be happy with a leader who does. So the nominee will find it almost impossible to embrace the surge, and certainly not after having disparaged it caustically in the past. But if the nominee does not embrace the real possibility of victory in Iraq, he or she will run the risk of appearing defeatist, or worse, in the eyes of the same independent voters who fled the GOP in droves in 2006.
Meanwhile, the candidate most associated with the surge, John McCain, will (assuming he becomes the nominee of the Republican party) be uniquely well situated to deploy an accusation he has been leveling at the Democratic frontrunners for nearly a year. “I was very disappointed to see Senator Obama and Senator Clinton embrace the policy of surrender by voting against funds to support our brave men and women fighting in Iraq,” McCain said about a vote the two Democrats cast in May 2007. He called this “the equivalent of waving a white flag of surrender to al Qaeda.”
I'm not quite sure if his analysis of 2008 will prove true or not. Clearly Barack Obama, most likely to surrender precipitously, is gathering momentum in this Election in ways that seemed impossible.
Part of me wonders if Americans simply want to return to the blissful ignorance of the Clinton years, when the end of the Cold War and relative peace abroad had us convinced that our enemies were no longer amassing against us. We're tired of Iraq. I'm tired of the endless discussion of it. Apparently so is the New York Times, which is giving far less ink to the War in Iraq now that we are winning.
War politics in 2008 is a wild card. We've got eight more months of it until November. Only a fool would try to predict with certainty what the result will be.